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Several papers–see, e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004)–have documented how the reaction function of the U.S.
monetary authority has been passive, and destabilising, before the appoint-
ment of Paul Volcker, and active and stabilising since then. In this paper
we ﬁrst compare and contrast the two sub-periods in terms of several key
business-cycle ‘stylised facts’. The latter period appears to be characterised by
al o w e ri n ﬂation persistence; a smaller volatility of reduced-form innovations to
both inﬂation and real GDP growth; and a systematically smaller amplitude of
business-cycle frequency ﬂuctuations.
Working with the Smets-Wouters (2003) sticky-price, sticky-wage DSGE
model of the U.S. economy, we then investigate how such stylised facts change
systematically with changes in the parameters of a simple forward-looking mon-
etary rule. We solve the model under indeterminacy via the procedure intro-
duced by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003). The determinacy and indeteminacy
regions appear to be characterised by two markedly diﬀerent sets of macro-
economic stylised facts. Further, in several cases the relationship between the
parameters of the monetary rule and key stylised facts under indeterminacy
is a sort of mirror image of what it is under determinacy: both inﬂation per-
sistence and the volatility of its reduced-form innovations, for example, are
increasing in the coeﬃcient on inﬂation under indeterminacy, decreasing under
determinacy.
Finally, we compare the stylised facts identiﬁed in the data with those gen-
erated by the Smets-Wouters model conditional on estimated monetary rules.
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1Although variation in the monetary rule across sub-periods can,i np r i n c i p l e ,
explain the broad features of the variation in the macroeconomic stylised facts
we consider, results are in general not consistent across diﬀerent inﬂation mea-
sures and output gap proxies. In particular, some of our estimates imply that
the pre-Volcker era, too, was characterised by a determinate equilibrium, in
spite of the lower activism of the monetary rule.
Keywords: monetary policy rules; indeterminacy; business cycles; frequency
domain; median-unbiased estimation.
1 Introduction
In recent years, several papers–see in particular Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000)
and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–have documented marked changes in the conduct
of U.S. monetary policy over the post-WWII era. Speciﬁcally, the reaction function
of the U.S. monetary authority is estimated to have been passive, and destabilising,
before Volcker, and active and stabilising since then.1 A second group of studies–
see, e.g., Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Kim, Nelson,
and Piger (2003), and Stock and Watson (2002)–has documented a marked increase
in U.S. economic stability over (roughly) the last two decades, with the volatility
of reduced-form innovations to both inﬂation and output growth being estimated to
have drastically fallen compared to previous years.2
These two strands of literature prompt two obvious questions:
(1) ‘What is the relationship between historical changes in the conduct of U.S.
monetary policy and the increase in U.S. economic stability?’
(2) ‘At a more general level, what is the impact of changes in the conduct of
monetary policy on key macroeconomic ‘stylised facts’, like inﬂation persistence, or
the amplitude of business-cycle frequency ﬂuctuations?’
In this paper we ﬁrst compare and constrast the two sub-periods preceding and,
respectively, following the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System in terms of a number of key business-cycle
‘stylised facts’. The latter period appears to be characterised by a lower inﬂation
persistence; a smaller volatility of reduced-form innovations to inﬂation and output
growth; and a systematically lower amplitude of business-cycle frequency ﬂuctuations
for all the macroeconomic indicators we consider, with the only exception of base
1For a contrarian view, see Sims (1999), Sims and Zha (2002), and Hanson (2002).
2See also Blanchard and Simon (2001), Chauvet and Potter (2001), Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-
Quiros (2002), and Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) on the increased stability of the U.S. economy;
Cogley and Sargent (2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2003), on changes in the stochastic properties of
U.S. inﬂation (in particular, in inﬂation persistence) since the beginning of the 1960s; and Brainard
and Perry (2000) on changes in the slope of the U.S. Phillips curve.
2money growth. Finally, consistent with Brainard and Perry (2000)’s ﬁnding of a
decrease in the slope of the U.S. Phillips curve over the last two decades, the gain and
the coherence between cyclical indicators (the rate of unemployment, and an ‘activity
factor’ constructed along the lines of Stock and Watson (1999b)) and inﬂation at the
business-cycle frequencies appear to have decreased, after 1979, compared with the
pre-Volcker era, although the change is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels.
Working with the sticky-price, sticky-wage DSGE model of the U.S. economy
recently estimated via Bayesian methods by Smets and Wouters (2003), and pre-
liminarly, to build intuition, with the standard workhorse New Keynesian model of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), we then investigate how such stylised facts change
systematically with changes in the coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap in a
simple Taylor rule. Given that, as documented in the previously mentioned papers,
the pre-Volcker period appears to have been characterised by a passive monetary
rule, we do not restrict our investigation uniquely to the determinacy region, solv-
ing the model under indeterminacy via the procedure recently introduced by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003). The determinacy and indeterminacy regions appear to be
characterised by a markedly diﬀerent set of macroeconomic stylised facts. Further,
in several cases the relationship between the parameters of the monetary rule and
key stylised facts under indeterminacy is a sort of mirror image of what it is under
determinacy: both inﬂation persistence and the volatility of its reduced-form innova-
tions, for example, are increasing in the coeﬃcient on inﬂation under indeterminacy,
decreasing under determinacy. Finally, we compare the stylised facts identiﬁed in
the data with those generated by the Smets-Wouters model conditional on estimated
monetary rules. Although variation in the monetary rule across sub-periods can,i n
principle, explain the broad features of the variation in the macroeconomic stylised
f a c t sw ec o n s i d e r ,r e s u l t sa r ei ngeneral not consistent across diﬀerent inﬂation mea-
sures and output gap proxies. In particular, some of our estimates imply that the
pre-Volcker era, too, was characterised by a determinate equilibrium, in spite of the
lower activism of the monetary rule.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the dataset. In
section 3 we identify key business-cycle stylised facts for the sub-periods of interest.
Section 4 investigates the relationship between changes in the conduct of monetary
policy, and changes in the very same stylised facts we previously investigated in the
data. In section 5 we compare the stylised facts identiﬁed in section 4 with those gen-
erated by the Smets-Wouters model conditional on estimated forward-looking mon-
etary rules. Section 6 concludes, and outlines several possible directions for future
research.
32T h e D a t a
The quarterly real GDP3 and GDP deﬂator series4 are from U.S. Department of
Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Quarterly series for real private consump-
tion and investment in billions of 2000 chained dollars are from Table 1.1.6. of the
National Income and Product Accounts, downloadable from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis site on the web. Both series are seasonally adjusted and quoted at an annual
rate. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce ( h e n c e f o r t h ,C B O )o u t p u tg a pm e a s u r eh a s
been constructed as the diﬀerence between the logarithms of quarterly real GDP and
the CBO potential real GDP series.5 For all series the sample period is 1954:3-2003:3.
Turning to monthly series, the consumer price index6 and employment7 series are
from the U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The federal funds
rate8 and base money9 series are from FRED II, the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis web data search engine. The activity factor we use in section 3.4 has been
constructed, following Stock and Watson (1999b), as the ﬁrst principal component
extracted from a matrix of (logged) HP-ﬁltered indicators. Following Stock and Wat-
son (1999b), ﬁltering is implemented by exploiting the state-space representation of
the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltering problem.10 A detailed list of the series used in the con-
struction of the activity factor is contained in appendix A. The producer price index
for fuels and related products11 used in the next section is from the U.S. Department
of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Both the interest rate on 10-year constant matu-
rity Treasury bills,12 and the rate on 3-month Treasury bills quoted on the secondary
market,13 are from the Federal Reserve Board. For all monthly series the sample pe-
riod is 1954:7-2003:9. Monthly series have been converted to the quarterly frequency
either by taking averages within the quarter (this is the case, for example, of the
Federal funds rate, and of employment and unemployment series), or by keeping the
last observation from each quarter (this is the case, for example, of the CPI and of
3‘GDPC1: Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate, Quar-
terly, Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars’.
4‘GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator, Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly,
Index 1996=100’.
5‘GDPPOT: Real Potential Gross Domestic Product, U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Of-
ﬁce, Quarterly, Billions of Chained 1996 Dollars’.
6‘CPIAUCSL: Consumer Price Index For All Urban Consumers: All Items, Consumer Price
Index, Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, Index 1982-84=100’
7‘CE16OV: Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years & Over, Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, Thou-
sands’.
8‘FEDFUNDS: Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate, Averages of Daily Figures, Monthly, Percent’.
9‘AMBNS: St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base; Billions of Dollars; NSA’.
10For technical details, see Stock and Watson (1999b).
11‘PPIENG: Producer Price Index: Fuels & Related Products & Power, Producer Price Index,
Not Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly’.
12‘GS10: 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Av e r a g e so fB u s i n e s sD a y s ,M o n t h l y ,P e r c e n t ’ .
13‘TB3MS: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, Averages of Business Days, Discount
Basis, Monthly, Percent’.
4the producer price index for fuels and related products). A detailed list of all the
series can be found in appendix A.
3 Macroeconomic Stylised Facts
In this section we present some key macroeconomic stylised facts for the three sub-
periods of interest, the ones preceding and, respectively, following the appointment of
Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
and the post-1982 era.14 We focus on inﬂation persistence; the volatility of reduced-
form innovations to inﬂation and real GDP growth; the amplitude of business-cycle
frequency ﬂuctuations for key macroeconomic series; and the correlation between
inﬂation and two alternative cyclical indicators, the rate of unemployment and a ‘real
activity’ dynamic factor. Although in recent years several papers have documented a
widespread increase in U.S. economic stability over the last two decades, to the best
of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study to systematically compare the pre-Volcker and
the post-1979 eras in terms of a broad list of key macroeconomic facts.15
From a methodological point of view, the techniques we use–univariate autore-
gressions; band-pass ﬁltering techniques; and cross-spectral methods–characterise
themselves for being based on a minimal set of identifying assumptions. Our hope
is that, by eschewing methods based on complex identiﬁcation schemes, like struc-
tural VAR analysis, we will be capable of ‘nailing down’ a set of reasonably robust
stylised facts. For this reason, we ignore conditional stylised facts like the shape of
impulse-responses to a monetary shock.16
3.1 Inﬂation persistence, and the volatility of reduced-form
inﬂation innovations
Table 1 reports results from estimating AR(p) models for both quarterly CPI and
quarterly GDP deﬂator inﬂation, for the three sub-periods of interest. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate
yt = µ + φ1yt−1 + φ2yt−2 + ... + φpyt−p + ut (1)
v i aO L S ,c h o o s i n gt h el a go r d e r ,p, based on the Bayes information criterion, with an
upper bound P=6 on the possible number of lags. For each sub-sample we report the
14There are at least two reasons for excluding the period between Volcker’s appointment and the
end of 1982 from the Volcker-Greenspan era. First, as shown for example by Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), during a signiﬁcant portion of this period the Fed pursued a policy of targeting non-borrowed
reserves. Second, the Volcker disinﬂation can arguably be considered as a highly idiosyncratic, one-
shot episode marking the transition between two diﬀerent monetary policy regimes, and as such
should probably not be ascribed to any of the two.
15Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, table __) contain a brief and informal comparison based on
the standard deviation of inﬂation.
16On this, see Hanson (2002) and Sims and Zha (2002).
5estimated mean, the innovation variance, and the median-unbiased estimate of our
preferred measure of persistence–which, following Andrews and Chen (1994), we take
it to be the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients17–computed via the Hansen (1999)
‘grid bootstrap’ procedure. Speciﬁcally, following Hansen (2000, section III.A) we re-
cast (1) into the augmented Dickey-Fuller form yt=µ+ρyt−1+γ1yt−1+...+γp−1yt−(p−1)
+ut,w h e r eρ is the sum of the AR coeﬃcients in (1), and we simulate the sampling
distribution of the t-statistic t=(ˆ ρ-ρ)/ˆ S(ˆ ρ),w h e r eˆ ρ is the OLS estimate of ρ,a n dˆ S(ˆ ρ)
is its estimated standard error, over a grid of possible values [ˆ ρ-4ˆ S(ˆ ρ); ˆ ρ+4ˆ S(ˆ ρ)],w i t h
step increments equal to 0.01. For each of the possible values in the grid, we consider
999 replications. For each sub-sample we report both the median-unbiased estimate
of ρ and the 90%-coverage conﬁdence interval computed based on the bootstrapped
distribution of the t-statistic. Estimates for both the mean and the innovation vari-
ance have been computed conditional on the median-unbiased estimate of ρ.T h e
estimate of the standard error for the mean, a non-linear function of the estimated
parameters, has been computed via the delta method.
Table 1 Estimated AR(p)m o d e l sf o rU . S .i n ﬂation, by sub-period
Sub-periods: ˆ ρ, and 90% Innovation va-
Lag order Mean∗ (st.err.) conf. interval riance∗ (st.err.)
Based on quarterly CPI inﬂation
Before Volcker 2 – 1.00 [0.86; 1.04] 3.84 (0.55)
Volcker-Greenspan 3 3.03 (0.31) 0.64 [0.51; 0.78] 3.42 (0.51)
Post-1982 3 3.04 (0.25) 0.64 [0.37; 1.00] 2.51 (0.41)
Based on quarterly GDP deﬂator inﬂation
Before Volcker 2 6.91 (30.89) 0.96 [0.84; 1.03] 2.20 (0.32)
Volcker-Greenspan 6 2.21 (0.15) 0.76 [0.68; 0.84] 0.60 (0.09)
Post-1982 3 2.24 (0.39) 0.85 [0.66; 1.03] 0.64 (0.10)
∗ In percentage points. ρ =s u mo ft h eA Rc o e ﬃcients. St. err. = standard error.
Several ﬁndings stand out. First–consistent with the results reported in, e.g.
Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2003), Stock and Watson (2002), and Benati (2003)–a fall
in the volatility of reduced-form innovations. The decrease is particularly marked,
and statistically signiﬁcant, for GDP deﬂator inﬂation, while it is less marked, and not
statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, for CPI inﬂation. Estimating (1) based
on the month-on-month rate of growth of the CPI (quoted at annual rate), however,
17As shown by Andrews and Chen (1994), the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients maps one-
to-one into two alternative measures of persistence, the cumulative impulse-response function to a
one-time innovation and the spectrum at the frequency zero. Andrews and Chen (1994) also contain
an extensive discussion of why an alternative measure favored, e.g., by Stock (1991) and DeJong and
Whiteman (1991), the largest autoregressive root, may provide a misleading indication of the true
extent of persistence of the series depending on the speciﬁc values taken by the other autoregressive
roots.
6produces sharper results, with the volatility of reduced-form shocks estimated, for
the three sub-periods, at 8.32 (0.69), 5.34 (0.46), and 4.44 (0.41).18 Although our
focus is on the quarterly frequency, the overall impression is therefore of a clear fall
in the innovation variance for CPI inﬂa t i o n ,t o o . S e c o n d ,b a s e do nb o t hi n d i c e s ,
inﬂation is estimated to have been very highly persistent during the pre-Volcker era.
In particular, CPI inﬂation is estimated as an exact unit root process, while for GDP
deﬂator inﬂation the null of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level, and the
median-unbiased estimate of ρ is still extremely high, at 0.96. As for the post-1979
years evidence is not clear-cut. While results based on the CPI suggest a marked fall
in persistence19 (although, for the post-1982 period, the 90% conﬁdence interval is
v e r yw i d e ,t ot h ep o i n tt h a ti ti sn o tp o s s i b l et or e j e c tt h en u l lo fau n i tr o o t ) ,r e s u l t s
b a s e do nG D Pd e ﬂator inﬂation are mixed. In particular, while a comparison between
the pre- and post-1979 periods clearly suggests a fall in persistence, results for the
post-1982 years point towards a smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant decrease, to
the point that the null of a unit root cannot be rejected.
3.2 The volatility of reduced-form innovations to real GDP
growth
Table 2 reports Hansen (1999) median-unbiased estimates of ρ; and estimates of
the mean and the innovation variance in (1), computed conditional on the median-
unbiased estimate of the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients, for real GDP growth.
Consistent with the evidence reported in, e.g., Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000), the Volcker-Greenspan and post-1982 sub-periods appear to
be characterised by a markedly lower volatility of reduced-form innovations than the
pre-Volcker era. In particular, the innovation variance is estimated to have decreased
by 58.7 and respectively 75.4% compared with the former period. Persistence, on
the other hand, appears to have increased, although the changes are not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Table 2 Estimated AR(p) models for U.S. real GDP growth,
by sub-period
ˆ ρ, and 90% Innovation va-
Sub-periods: Lag order Mean∗ (st.err.) conf. interval riance∗ (st.err.)
Before Volcker 1 3.84 (0.36) 0.29 [0.13; 0.46] 18.35 (2.62)
Volcker-Greenspan 3 3.26 (0.37) 0.44 [0.22; 0.67] 7.57 (1.13)
Post-1982 2 3.28 (0.26) 0.61 [0.41; 0.83] 4.51 (0.72)
∗ In percentage points. ρ =s u mo ft h eA Rc o e ﬃcients. St. err. = standard error.
18The full set of results is available upon request.
19Estimates based on the month-on-month rate of growth of the CPI (quoted at annual rate)
conﬁrm the decrease in persistence, with the median-unbiased estimate of ρ for the three sub-periods
being equal to 0.94 [0.84; 1.02], 0.80 [0.69; 0.91], and respectively 0.46 [0.31; 0.62].
73.3 The amplitude of business-cycle ﬂuctuations
Table 3 reports standard deviations of business-cycle components for (the logarithms
of) several macroeconomic indicators for the three sub-periods of interest. The vari-
ables we consider are the same as those analysed in Smets and Wouters (2003). Follow-
ing established conventions in business-cycle analysis20,w ed e ﬁne the business-cycle
frequency band as the one containing all the components of a series with a frequency
of oscillation between 6 and 32 quarters. Business-cycle components are extracted
via the optimal approximated band-pass ﬁlter recently proposed by Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003).21
Table 3 The amplitude of business-cycle ﬂuctuations: standard
deviations of band-pass ﬁltered (logarithms of) macroeconomic
indicators, by sub-period*
Real GDP Consumption Investment Employment
Before Volcker 0.018 0.015 0.079 0.011
Volcker-Greenspan 0.012 8.0E-3 0.060 7.4E-3
Post-1982 9.9E-3 6.5E-3 0.055 6.7E-3
CPI Price level, GDP deﬂator Price level,
inﬂation CPI inﬂation GDP deﬂator
Before Volcker 1.795 0.014 1.189 9.1E-3
Volcker-Greenspan 1.248 8.7E-3 0.715 5.7E-3
Post-1982 0.952 6.6E-3 0.553 4.4E-3
Federal Base money
funds rate growth
Before Volcker 1.540 1.116
Volcker-Greenspan 1.298 2.614
Post-1982 1.121 2.740
* All series have been logged except the Federal funds rate, inﬂation measures,
and base money growth.
All the series, with the single exception of base money growth, exhibit the same
20See for example King and Watson (1996), Baxter and King (1999), Stock and Watson (1999a),
and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
21The Christiano-Fitzgerald band-pass ﬁltered series is computed as the linear projection of the
ideal band-pass ﬁltered series onto the available sample. (For a deﬁnition of the ideal band-pass
ﬁlter, see for example Sargent (1987).) The ﬁlter weights are chosen to minimise a weighted mean
squared distance criterion between the ideal band-pass ﬁltered series and its optimal approximation.
The criterion is computed directly in the frequency domain, weighting the squared distance between
the two objects frequency by frequency, based on the series’ spectral density. This clearly requires,
in principle, knowledge of the series’ stochastic properties. In practice, Christiano and Fitzgerald
show that for ‘typical’ time series representations–i.e., for representations that ﬁt macroeconomic
data well–the ﬁlter computed under the assumption the series is a random walk is always nearly
optimal. In what follows we use such a recommended ﬁlter for all series.
8ranking among the three sub-periods in terms of amplitude of business-cycle ﬂuc-
tuations, with the pre-Volcker and the post-1982 eras being characterised by the
highest and, respectively, the lowest volatilities, and the Volcker-Greenspan period in
between. For several series, the contrast between the pre-Volcker and the post-1982
periods is striking. For the log of real GDP, for example, volatility in the former period
is 82.6% higher than in the latter, while for consumption the corresponding ﬁgure is
beyond 125%. The volatility of inﬂation measures has decreased by 47% for the CPI
and, respectively by 53.5% for the GDP deﬂator (the logaritms of both price indices
display analogous marked decreases in volatility). Finally, the Federal funds rate ex-
hibits a still respectable 27.2% decrease in volatility. As for a comparison between the
pre- and post-1979 periods, due to the inclusion of the turbulent Volcker disinﬂation
episode into the latter sub-period, the fall in volatility is less striking. Still, however,
the decrease in the amplitude of business-cycle ﬂuctuations is generalised (again, with
the exception of base money growth), and for some series–consumption, GDP deﬂa-
tor inﬂation, and the logarithms of both the CPI and the GDP deﬂator–it is quite
marked, between 40 and 45%, while for the logarithms of real GDP and employment
it is around 34-35%.
3.4 The correlation between inﬂation and cyclical indicators
at the business-cycle frequencies
Table 4 reports average cross-spectral statistics, and 90% conﬁdence intervals, be-
tween monthly CPI inﬂation and two cyclical indicators–the unemployment rate,
and the previously discussed ‘real activity’ dynamic factor–at the business-cycle fre-
quencies (again, we deﬁne the business-cycle frequency band as the one containing all
the components of a series with a frequency of oscillation between 6 and 32 quarters).
Speciﬁcally, let πt and xt be inﬂation and the relevant cyclical indicator; let Fπ(ωj)
and Fx(ωj) be the smoothed spectra of the two series at the Fourier frequency ωj;
let Cx,π(ωj) and Qx,π(ωj) be the smoothed co-spectrum and, respectively, quadrature
spectrum between xt and πt corresponding to the Fourier frequency ωj;a n dl e tΩBC
be the set of all the Fourier frequencies belonging to the business-cycle frequency
band. The estimated average smoothed gain, phase angle and coherence between xt
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We estimate both the spectral densities of xt and πt, the co-spectrum, and the
quadrature spectrum, by smoothing the periodograms and, respectively, the cross-
periodogram in the frequency domain by means of a Bartlett spectral window. Fol-
lowing Berkowitz and Diebold (1998), we select the bandwidth automatically via the
procedure introduced by Beltrao and Bloomﬁeld (1987).
We compute conﬁdence intervals via the multivariate spectral bootstrap proce-
dure introduced by Berkowitz and Diebold (1998) (for technical details, see appendix
B): given that we are here dealing with the average values taken by the cross-spectral
statistics at the business-cycle frequencies, traditional formulas for computing con-
ﬁdence intervals for the gain, the phase angle, and the coherence at the frequency
ω–as found for example in Koopmans (1974), ch. 8–cannot be applied, and the
spectral bootstrap is therefore the only possibility. We do not report conﬁdence in-
tervals for the phase angle: given the periodicity of the tangent function, stochastic
realisations of the (average) phase angle obtained by bootstrapping the spectral den-
sity matrix cannot be properly interpreted. Intuitively, a suﬃciently large positive
(negative) stochastic realisation is converted by the inverse tangent function into a
negative (positive) one, with the result that conﬁdence percentiles for the phase angle
cannot literally be constructed.
22Given that the Fourier frequencies are uncorrelated, an average value for the two spectra, for the
co-spectrum, and for the quadrature spectrum can be computed as a simple average within ΩBC.
Given the non-linearities involved in computing gains, phase angles, and coherences, the resulting
values are diﬀerent from the ones we would get by simply taking the averages of estimated gains,
phase angles, and coherences within the band. I wish to thank Fabio Canova for extremely helpful
discussions on these issues.
10T a b l e4 T h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e ni n ﬂation and cyclical indicators at the
business-cycle frequencies: average cross-spectral statistics and 90%
conﬁdence intervals
Based on unemployment: Based on the activity factor:
Before Volcker- Post- Before Volcker- Post-
Volcker Greenspan 1982 Volcker Greenspan 1982
Gain 0.77 0.60 0.42 0.22 0.15 0.10
[0.32; 1.63] [0.17; 1.61] [0.11; 1.34] [0.07; 0.44] [0.03; 0.39] [0.02; 0.33]
Coherence 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.21 0.16
[0.11; 0.43] [0.06; 0.46] [0.04; 0.42] [0.09; 0.50] [0.05; 0.48] [0.04; 0.44]
Phase
angle -0.75 -0.46 -0.71 -0.40 -0.31 -0.61
Conﬁdence intervals (in parentheses) have been computed via the Berkowitz-Diebold (1998)
multivariate spectral bootstrap procedure.
Three ﬁndings clearly emerge from the table. First, the imprecision of the es-
timates, with wide conﬁdence intervals for both the gain and the coherence for all
the three sub-periods, and based on either cyclical indicator. Second, in spite of the
width of the conﬁdence intervals for the three sub-periods, which systematically over-
lap with one another, the overall impression is of some decrease in both the gain and
the coherence over the post-1979 period, compared with the pre-Volcker era.23 This
is consistent with Brainard and Perry (2000)’s ﬁnding of a decrease in the slope of
the U.S. Phillips curve over the last two decades, based on a time-varying parameters
Phillips curve for U.S. inﬂation. Third, consistent with a vast body of evidence, for all
the three sub-periods, and based on either cyclical indicator, inﬂation clearly appears
to lag the cyclical component of economic activity, as shown by the negative values
taken by the phase angle.
4 Monetary Rules and Macroeconomic Stylised Facts
4.1 The Smets-Wouters (2003) model of the U.S. economy
The model we use is a slightly modiﬁed version of the sticky-price, sticky-wage DSGE
model of the U.S. economy recently proposed by Smets and Wouters (2003), and
estimated via Bayesian techniques. Since the structure of the model is extensively
discussed in Smets and Wouters (2003, section 2), in what follows we proceed rapidly,
and we refer the reader to the original paper for further details.
23For the United Kingdom, on the other hand, Benati (2004) documents marked changes in
the correlation between inﬂation and unemployment at the business-cycle frequencies over the last
several decades, with the correlation being comparatively steeper during the high inﬂation of the
1970s, and strikingly ﬂat over the last decade, associated with the introduction of an inﬂation
targeting regime.
























































































t /Pt) are consumption, labor supply,
and real money balances of household j;  b
t,  L
t and  M
t are preference disturbances;
σc is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient (within this setup, the same as the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution); σL is the inverse of the elasticity of
the work eﬀort with respect to the real wage; σM is the inverse of the elasticity
of money holdings with respect to the interest rate; Ht, the external habit stock,
is a function of aggregate past consumption, Ht=hCt−1,w i t h0 ≤ h< 1; (B
j
t/Pt) is
real bond holdings, with price bt; w
j
t is the real wage; K
j
t is the stock of physical





t)] is the net return on capital, where z
j
t
is eﬀective capital utilisation, rk
t is the real return on capital, and Ψ(z
j
t) represents
costs associated with the level of capital utilisation; I
j
t is gross investment; and D
j
t
are dividends distributed to the households.



























here put FOC for money (9)
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption, and Rt =1 /bt =1+it is the gross
nominal bond rate.
Households set nominal wages Calvo-style. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2002), those households that, in a given
period, do not receive the random Calvo signal, index their own wage to a weighted
average of last period’s inﬂation and the inﬂation target. This results in the following



















24Diﬀerent from Smets and Wouters (2003), and in order to study how key business cycle stylised
facts involving money growth change as a function of the parameters of the monetary rule, we here
introduce real balances in the utility function along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2002).
12where ˜ Wt is the optimal reset wage at time t; ¯ π is the inﬂation target of the monetary
authority; ξw is the fraction of households that do not receive the Calvo signal; and
γw and λw are the degree of indexation to past inﬂation, and respectively, the wage
markup. At the set wage, households supply any amount of labour that is demanded.
Intermediate goods producers set the nominal price for their individual product in an
analogous way, resulting in the following law of motion for the aggregate price level






















where the notation is obvious.
Households own the capital stock, which rent to intermediate goods producers at
the rate rk
t. They choose investment, and the utilisation rate of the existing capital
stock, in order to maximise their intertemporal objective function, subject to (6) and
to the capital accumulation equation










where It is gross investment; τ is the depreciation rate; S(·) is the adjustment cost
function; and  I
t is a shock to the relative eﬃciency of investment goods. Optimi-
sation results in the following ﬁrst-order conditions for the real value of capital, Qt,













































t = Ψ(zt) (15)
Finally, goods market equilibrium implies
Yt = Ct + It + Ψ(zt)Kt−1 (16)
Diﬀerent from Smets and Wouters (2003), in what follows we assume that all distur-
bances are serially uncorrelated. A key reason for doing so is to better highlight the
diﬀerence between the properties of the model economy within the determinacy and
indeterminacy regions.
Log-linearising (7)-(16) around a non-stochastic steady-state, we obtain the fol-
































































































ˆ Lt=- ˆ wt+(1+ψ)ˆ r
k
t+ ˆ Kt−1 (23)
ˆ Yt=φˆ  
a
t+φα ˆ Kt−1+φαψˆ r
k
t+φ(1-α)ˆ Lt=ˆ Ct(1-τkY)+τkY ˆ It (24)




















where a ˆ above a variable indicates the percentage deviation from the non-stochastic
steady-state, α is the capital income share, and ˆ  
a
t is a productivity shock. Equations
(17) to (19) are the Euler equations for consumption, investment, and, respectively,
the real value of capital; equation (20) is the law of motion for capital; equations (21)
and (22) are Phillips curves for nominal prices and, respectively, nominal wages; (23)
describes labor demand; (24) is a good market equilibrium condition; and equation
(25) is the law of motion for real balances. We close the model with the following
monetary rule
ˆ rt = ρˆ rt−1 +( 1− ρ)
h
φπˆ πt+1|t + φY ˆ Yt+1|t
i
+  r,t (26)
where the notation is obvious.
Finally, two important points concerning the way the model has actually been
estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003). First, the monetary rule they use to close the
model (see their equation 36) is very diﬀerent from (26)–speciﬁcally, (i) it is purely
backward-looking; (ii) it features a time-varying inﬂation target evolving according
to a random walk; and (iii) it contains, as additional terms, the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
output gap, and of the deviation of inﬂation from target. An obvious rationale for
using such a rule is that it leads to a better ﬁt, but unfortunately this has the drawback
that the way parameters’ estimates have been obtained is not fully consistent with
the structure of the model we will be using. A simple justiﬁcation for our approach of
using Smets and Wouters’s parameters’ estimates is to treat it as a sort of ‘informed
calibration’, where parameters’ values are calibrated to estimates based on a closely
14related structure. A more serious problem is that Smets and Wouters (2003), in line
with existing literature–with the single exception of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–
perform estimation by restricting the parameter space to the determinacy region.
Given the strong evidence that, for a signiﬁcant portion of the post-WWII era, the
U.S. monetary rule has been such as to give rise to an indeterminate equilibrium,25
this, as stressed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), has the potential to introduce a
bias in parameter’s estimates. Unfortunately, to this problem there seems to be, at
the moment, no solution, as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)–the only paper estimating
a DSGE New Keynesian model without imposing the restriction that the parameters
lay within the determinacy region–is based on a markedly simpler model (we will
be brieﬂy using their estimated model in section 4.3). Given that it is not possible
even to gauge an idea about the size or direction of such a potential bias, in what
follows we have decided to simply use the Smets-Wouters estimates to calibrate the
model. In evaluating the results we will obtain, however, it is important to keep such
a caveat in mind.
4.2 Solution method under determinacy and indeterminacy







t ]0,w h e r e
the auxiliary variables XC
t , ..., X
Q
t are deﬁned as XC
t =ˆ Ct, ..., X
Q
t = ˆ Qt. We also de-
ﬁne the vector of structural shocks  t ≡ [ˆ  
a
t, ˆ  
b
t, ˆ  
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t, ˆ  
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t−1, ˆ  
Q
t , ˆ  
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t ,  r,t]0, and the vector of








t ]0,w h e r eηC
t ≡ ˆ Ct- ˆ Ct|t−1, ..., ηrk
t ≡ ˆ rk
t-ˆ rk
t|t−1.
Model (17)-(24) can then be put into the ‘Sims canonical form’26
Γ0ξt = Γ1ξt−1 + Ψ t + Πηt (27)
where Γ0, Γ1, Ψ and Π a r em a t r i c e sc o n f o r m a b l et oξt, ξt−1,  t and ηt.
In order to solve the model under both determinacy and indeterminacy, following
Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) we exploit the QZ decomposition of the matrix pencil
(Γ0-λΓ1). Speciﬁcally, given a pencil (Γ0-λΓ1), Moler and Stewart (1973) prove the
existence of matrices Q, Z, Λ,a n dΩ such that QQ0=ZZ0=In, Λ and Ω are upper
triangular, Γ0=Q0ΛZ,a n dΓ1=Q0ΩZ.B y d e ﬁning wt=Q0ξt, and by premultiplying





















(Ψ t + Πηt) (28)
where the vector of generalised eigenvalues, λ (equal to the ratio between the diagonal




2]0,w i t hλ2 collecting all
the explosive eigenvalues, and Ω, Λ,a n dQ have been partitioned accordingly. In
25Besides Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), see our estimates
in section 5.1 below.
26See Sims (2002).
15particular, Qj· collects the blocks of rows corresponding to the stable (j=1) and,













x=Q2·Π. Given that λ2 is purely explosive, obtaining a stable
solution to (27) requires w2,t to be equal to 0 for any t ≥0. This can be accomplished
by setting w2,0=0, and by selecting, for each t> 0, the forecast error vector ηt in such
aw a yt h a tΨ∗
x t + Π∗
xηt=0.
Under determinacy, the dimension of ηt is exactly equal to the number of unstable
eigenvalues, and ηt is therefore uniquely determined. Under indeterminacy, on the
other hand, the number of unstable eigenvalues falls short of the number of forecast
errors, and the forecast error vector ηt is therefore not uniquely determined, which is
at the root of the possibility of sunspot ﬂuctuations. Lubik and Schorfheide (2003),
however, prove the following. By deﬁning UDV0=Π∗
x as the singular value decom-
position of Π∗
x, and by assuming that for each  t there always exists an ηt such that
Ψ∗
x t + Π∗











 t + V·2M2s
∗
t (30)
where D11 is the upper-left diagonal block of D, containing the square roots of the non-
zero singular values of Π∗
x in decreasing order; s∗
t is a vector of sunspot shocks; and M1
and M2 are matrices whose entries are not determined by the solution procedure, and
which basically ‘index’ (or parameterise) the model’s solution under indeterminacy.
As (30) shows, there are two consequences of indeterminacy. First, assuming
M1 6=0 , the impact of structural shocks is no longer uniquely identiﬁed. Second,
assuming M2 6=0 , sunspot shocks may inﬂuence aggregate ﬂuctuations. Concerning
M1 and M2 we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), ﬁrst, by setting M2s∗
t=st,w h e r e
st can therefore be interpreted as a vector of ‘reduced-form’ sunspot shocks. Second,
we choose the matrix M1 in such a way as to preserve continuity of the impact matrices
of the impulse-responses of the model at the boundary between the determinacy and
the indeterminacy region.27 Ideally, this should be done by setting M2=0 in (30), and







Unfortunately, this requires knowledge of which, among the generalised eigenvalues
that are currently stable under indeterminacy, would become explosive under de-
terminacy. As pointed out by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), the generalised Schur
27As discussed in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), a key reason for doing so is that allowing the
model’s response to structural shocks to jump discontinuously between the two regions appears as
highly unattractive. Results based on the alternative ‘orthogonality normalisation’, in which M1
is set to 0, so that fundamental and sunspot shocks perturb the system in completely unrelated
‘directions’, are available upon request.
16decomposition, as implemented by the Moler-Stewart (1973) QZ algorithm, suﬀers
from the drawback that, following a perturbation of the matrix pencil, it does not
necessarily preserve the ordering of the generalised eigenvalues.28 As a result, (31)
cannot literally be computed, and the whole method for getting M1 breaks down.
Once again we have therefore followed Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), by adopting
the following approach. Let θ be the parameters’ vector, and let ΘI and ΘD be
the sets of all the θ’s corresponding to the indeterminacy and, respectively, to the
determinacy regions. For every θ ∈ ΘI we identify a corresponding vector ˜ θ ∈ ΘD
laying just on the boundary between the two regions.29 By deﬁnition, the two impact














28The problem is not unique to the QZ decomposition. In our quest for a solution, we explored
another algorithm for the numerical implementation of the generalized Schur decomposition, Kauf-
man’s LZ algorithm, as exposed in Kaufman (1974). (Kaufman’s original FORTRAN program, as
found in Kaufman (1975), is available from the NAG library. A MATLAB code based on Kaufman
(1974) is available from us upon request.) Exactly as the QZ algorithm, the LZ one does not
preserve the ordering of the eigenvalues.
We then tried the following approach based on matrix perturbation theory–as expounded in,
e.g., Stewart and Sun (1990). The key intuition is that, given a certain perturbation in the matrix
pencil (A-λB), e.g. (A-λB)=⇒( ˜ A-˜ λ ˜ B), where ˜ A=A+dA and ˜ B=B+dB,w i t hdA and dB being the
perturbations in the two matrices A and B, theory puts an upper limit to the perturbations in
the corresponding vectors of generalised eigenvalues. Speciﬁcally, let λh and ˜ λk be the h-th and,
respectively k-th generalised eigenvalues corresponding to the two pencils (A-λB) and ( ˜ A-˜ λ ˜ B).T h e
distance between λh and ˜ λk is typically measured by means of the ‘chordal metric’
χ(λh, ˜ λk)=( |λh − ˜ λk|)/[(1+|λh|2)
0.5(1+|˜ λk|2)
0.5]
As found, e.g., in Stewart and Sun (1990, p. 294, equation 2.3), the upper limit for χ(λh, ˜ λh) is
given by ¯ χ(λh, ˜ λh)=( |[dA dB]|)/(|a|2 + |b|2)0.5,w h e r ea=y0Ax and b=y0Bx,w i t hy and x being
the normed generalised eigenvectors corresponding to λh. In principle, by comparing χ(λh, ˜ λk) with
¯ χ(λh, ˜ λh) for each h, k=1, 2, ..., M,w i t hM being the size of λh, it should be possible to recover
the correct ordering of the generalised eigenvalues. Based on our experience, this unfortunately only
works for small perturbations, so that, in our case, if the parameter vector is relatively far away
from the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy regions, it is not possible to recover
the correct ordering of the eigenvalues.
29Speciﬁcally, for any [φπ, φy]0 such that θ ∈ ΘI,w ec h o o s et h ev e c t o r[ ˜ φπ, ˜ φy]0, such that the
resulting ˜ θ ∈ ΘD lies just on the boundary between the two regions, by minimising the criterion
˜ C=[(φπ-˜ φπ)2+(φy-˜ φy)2]1/2. It is important to stress that, in general, there is no clear-cut criterion
for choosing a speciﬁc vector on the boundary. Minimisation of ˜ C is based on the intuitive notion












x(˜ θ) ≡ B1(˜ θ) (34)
where Ψ∗(·) ≡ QΨ(·),a n dΠ∗(·) ≡ QΠ(·). We minimise the diﬀerence between the
two impact matrices, B1(˜ θ)-[B1(θ)+B2(θ)M1]=[B1(˜ θ)-B1(θ)]-B2(θ)M1 by means of a
least-squares regression of [B1(˜ θ)-B1(θ)] on B2(θ), thus setting M1=[B2(θ)0B2(θ)]−1×
B2(θ)0[B1(˜ θ)-B1(θ)].
The solution to (28) is now completely characterised. The forecast error ηt can
be substituted into the law of motion for w1,t,
w1,t = Λ
−1
11 Ω11w1,t−1 + Λ
−1
11 Q1· (Ψ t + Πηt) (35)
thus obtaining the ﬁnal solution for ξt as ξt=Qwt=Q[w0
1,t, w0
2,t]0.
4.3 A digression: the simple case of the standard workhorse
New Keynesian model
Before analysing the results based on the Smets-Wouters model, in this section we
brieﬂy discuss results based on the standard workhorse New Keynesian model of
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). There are several reasons for doing so. First, as
we already stressed, such a model is currently the only one for which we have a set of
estimates obtained without imposing the (very likely, implausible) restriction that the
parameters only lay within the determinacy region.30 As such, it should provide us
with a useful robustness check: if some of the stylised facts produced by this model as
we vary the parameters of the monetary rule turn out to be broadly similar to those
produced by the Smets-Wouters model based on a set of estimates possibly biased
by the fact of neglecting the possibility of indeterminacy, this should provide some
reassurance on the robustness/meaningfulness of the second set of facts. Second, the
simple structure of the model makes it possible to obtain a purely analytical solution
under both determinacy and indeterminacy,31 thus eliminating the need to resort to
the previously described approximated numerical solution.
The model is described by the following equations:
ˆ Yt = ˆ Yt+1|t − ϑ
−1 £
ˆ rt − ˆ πt+1|t
¤
+ gt (36)
ˆ πt = βˆ πt+1|t + κˆ Yt + ut (37)
30H e r e ,t o o ,t h e r ei sh o w e v e ras m a l lﬂy in the ointment, as the Taylor rule estimated by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) is the contemporanous version of (26)–i.e., ˆ πt+1|t and ˆ Yt+1|t have been replaced
by ˆ πt and ˆ Yt. We regard this, however, as a minor problem.
31See Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) and the technical appendix to Lubik and Schorfheide (2004),
available at Frank Schorfheide’s web page.
18where the notation is obvious, with gt and ut being white noise demand and supply
shocks. Finally, given that the monetary rule estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) is the contemporanous version of (26)–i.e., ˆ πt+1|t and ˆ Yt+1|t have been replaced
by ˆ πt and ˆ Yt, in this section (and only in this section) we close the model with such
a rule. Based on Lubik-Schorfheide’s (2004) Bayesian estimates, we calibrate the
key parameters as follows: β=0.99; κ=0.65; ϑ=1.8. Finally, we set σs,t h es t a n d a r d
deviation of sunspot shocks, to 0.2, and σg and σu, the standard deviations of demand
and supply shocks, to 0.25 and respectively 1.1.
Figures 1 and 2 show how key business-cycle stylised facts–inﬂation and output
gap persistence; the volatility of reduced-form innovations to inﬂation and the output
gap; and the correlation between inﬂation and the output gap–change with changes
in the parameters of the monetary rule. We consider a grid of 100 values of φπ
over the interval [0.5; 2], and of 75 values of φY over the interval [0; 1]. We set ρ
to 0.9.32 For each combination of φπ and φY i nt h eg r i dw es o l v et h em o d e lu n d e r
either determinacy or indeterminacy–the full analytical solution, computed along
the lines of Lubik and Schorfheide (2003) is available upon request–and we simulate
it for 10,000 periods.33 We estimate AR(p)m o d e l sf o ri n ﬂation and the output gap,
selecting the lag order based on the Bayes information criterion, for an upper bound
on p equal to 8. The sum of the AR coeﬃcients is, again, our measure of persistence.
We do not report Hansen (2000) grid-bootstrap corrected estimates of the sum of
the AR coeﬃcients for two reasons. First, with 7.500 points in the φπ-φY grid, it
would be simply infeasible. Second, the length of the simulation guarantees that the
distortion the grid bootstrap should correct for is not an issue here. Consistent with
our investigation of the correlation between inﬂation and cyclical indicators in section
3.4, in ﬁgure 2 we report estimates of the average gains, phase angles, and coherences
between inﬂation and the output gap at the business-cycle frequencies, based on the
same methodology we described in that section. Finally, following established practice
in econometrics–see, e.g., Hendry (1984), Ericsson (1991), and Diebold and Chen
(1996)–we do not report the raw results from the simulations, but rather estimated
response-surfaces.34
Several facts clearly emerge from the ﬁgures. First, ﬁg u r e1p o i n t st os i g n i ﬁcant
diﬀerences between the determinacy and the indeterminacy regions as far as the
persistence and the volatility of reduced-form innovations to either inﬂation or the
output gap are concerned. Given that the model is purely forward-looking, within
the determinacy region neither inﬂation nor the output gap exhibit any persistence.
Within the indeterminacy region, on the other hand, persistence is positive for both
32Experimentation with two alternative values, 0.5 and 0.7, showed that the qualitative features
of the results are invariant to the speciﬁc value chosen for ρ.
33More precisely, for 10,100, then discarding the ﬁrst 100 observations to make the impact of
initial conditions irrelevant.
34The methodology we use exactly follows Diebold and Chen (1996, p. 225), to which the reader
is referred, with the only diﬀerence that we consider expansions up to the third power (instead of
the second).
19variables–although not especially high, given that the model does not possess any
intrinsic inertia–and in the case of inﬂation it exhibits an interesting relation with
the parameters of the monetary rule, being, somehow counterintuitively, increasing in
φπ and decreasing in φY. As we will see in the next section, within the Smets-Wouters
model, too, inﬂation persistence is increasing in φπ within the indeterminacy region,
and such a result should therefore probably be regarded as reasonably robust. As
for the output gap, persistence is, as intuition would suggest, decreasing in φY,b u t ,
again counterintuitively, it appears to be mostly decreasing in φπ too.
Turning to the volatility of reduced-form innovations, within the determinacy
region we get the expected results, with the standard deviation of innovations to
inﬂa t i o n( t h eo u t p u tg a p )b e i n gd e c r e a s i n g( i n c r e a s i n g )i nφπ, and increasing (de-
creasing) in φY. As for the indeterminacy regions, however, several results are, again,
counterintuitive, with the volatility of reduced-form shocks to inﬂation, in particular,
being markedly increasing in φπ and decreasing in φY. As for the output gap, the
volatility is clearly increasing in both parameters.
Turning to ﬁgure 2, the two regions exhibit quite markedly diﬀerent properties
in terms of the correlation between inﬂation and the output gap, too. First, while
within the determinacy region inﬂation and the output gap move exactly in synch, as
shown by the zero value taken by the phase angle, within the indeterminacy region
the output gap leads inﬂation, with the lead being increasing in φY and decreasing
in φπ. Second, concerning the gain, the two regions appear to exactly mirror each
other, with the average gain at the business-cycle frequencies being decreasing in
φπ and increasing in φY within the determinacy region, and the opposite within the
indeterminacy region. Finally, the coherence is increasing in φπ within both regions,
while the impact of an increase in φY is positive within the determinacy region, and
negative within the indeterminacy region.
Summing up, two ﬁndings emerge from such an (admittedly limited) exercise.
First, in most cases, key macroeconomic stylised facts appear to be quite markedly
diﬀerent within the two regions. Second, for several facts of particular interest–
inﬂation persistence, and the strength of the correlation between inﬂation and the
output gap–the two regions appear to be a sort of mirror image of each other.
4.4 Monetary rules and the business-cycle stylised facts in
the Smets-Wouters model
Let’s now turn to the Smets-Wouters model. Figures 3-5 shows results from simula-
tions analogous to those we just discussed. Table 5 illustrates details of the calibra-
tion: all the parameters’ values have been calibrated based on the posterior modes of
Smets and Wouters (2003)’s Bayesian estimates, with the exception of the standard
deviation of sunspot shock, which we calibrated based on the posterior mode of Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004)’s estimates; and of σM, which we calibrated based on Smets
and Wouters (2002).
20T a b l e5 T h ec a l i b r a t i o nf o rt h eS m e t s - W o u t e r s
model
βταϕ σ M λw λp φ
0.99 0.025 0.24 6.14 5 0.5 0.5 1.584
ξw ξp γw γp ψσ c hσ L
0.809 0.902 0.324 0.47 0.27 1.815 0.636 1.942
Standard deviations of structural shocks:
Money demand 0.5 Labor supply 2.111
Wage markup 0.259 Productivity 0.48
Price markup 0.186 Consumption 1.271
Equity premium 0.615 Sunspot 0.5
Investment 0.357
Figure 3 shows how inﬂation and output gap persistence, and the volatility of
reduced-form innovations to inﬂation and the output gap, change with changes in the
parameters of the monetary rule. Again, all simulations are conditional on ρ=0.9.
Several ﬁndings emerge from the four panels. First, inﬂation persistence is monoton-
ically increasing in φY within both the determinacy and the indeterminacy regions,
and–as intuition would suggest–monotonically decreasing in φπ within the deter-
minacy region. Counterintuitively, however, and in line with the results based on
the standard New Keynesian model we discussed in section 4.3, it is monotonically
increasing in φπ under indeterminacy, for low values of φY quite markedly so. For
φY=0, for example, it increases from 0.65, corresponding to φπ= 0 . 5 ,t o0 . 9 8c o r r e -
sponding to φπ=0.99. Second, the responsiveness of inﬂation persistence to changes
in the parameters of the monetary rule is markedly greater under indeterminacy than
under determinacy. For φY=0, for example, an increase in φπ from 1 to 2 is associated
with a comparatively modest fall in persistence from 0.41 to 0.30. For higher values
of φY the responsiveness to changes in φπ is even smaller, and for φY=1 it is barely
discernible, going from 0.465 to 0.462. The same holds for φY. While for φπ=0.5 an
increase in φY f r o m0t o0 . 7 4( c l o s et ot h eb o u n d a r yb e t w e e nt h et w or e g i o n s )i sa s s o -
ciated with an increase in persistence from 0.65 to 0.99, for φπ=2 the corresponding
increase is from 0.30 to 0.45. Third–and not surprisingly–the actual extent of per-
sistence within the two regions is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, with the inderminacy region
being characterised by a markedly higher persistence. In particular, the ‘jump’ from
indeterminacy to determinacy associated with small increases in φπ and/or φY for
parameters’ conﬁgurations initially within ΘI, and close to the boundary, is associ-
ated with drastic falls in inﬂation persistence. For φY=0, for example, the ‘jump into
determinacy’ is associated with a fall in inﬂation persistence from 0.98 to 0.41.
T u r n i n gt oo u t p u tg a ppe r s i s t e n c e ,t w oﬁndings stand out. First, again not surpris-
ingly, a markedly greater persistence under indeterminacy than under determinacy.
Second, an increase in φY causes, as expected, a decrease in persistence under de-
terminacy, but, again counterintuitively, it causes an increase under indeterminacy.
21Such a result is independent of the speciﬁcv a l u et a k e nb yφπ and shows, once again,
that for key macroeconomic stylised facts the two regions seem to behave as mirror
images of each other.
Let’s now turn to the volatility of reduced-form innovations. Once again, the
two regions appear to be characterised by a markedly diﬀerent set of stylised facts.
First, for both variables, the volatility of shocks appears to be markedly greater
under indeterminacy than under determinacy. Second, once again, the responsiveness
of volatility to changes in the parameters of the monetary rule under inderminacy
appears, in general, quite markeldy greater than under determinacy. This is expecialy
clear for the volatility of reduced-form inﬂation innovations, but also holds for the
output gap. Finally, once again, the two regions appear to behave, along a number
of dimensions, as mirror images of each other. Exactly as in the case of the standard
worhorse New Keynesian model we discussed in section 4.3, the volatility of reduced-
form inﬂation innovations is increasing in φπ under indeterminacy, decreasing under
d e t e r m i n a c y .T h ei m p a c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nφY on the volatility of reduced-form output
gap innovations, on the other hand, appears to be negative within either region, with
the exception of a small portion of the indeterminacy region.
Figure 4 shows the average gain, phase angle and coherence between the output
gap and inﬂation at the business-cycle frequencies. Consistent with the results we
discussed in section 4.3 based on the standard New Keynesian model, the two re-
gions exhibit, once again, quite markedly diﬀerent properties. First, the strength of
the correlation–as measured by the average gain–is markedly lower under deter-
minacy, and is virtually unresponsive to changes in the parameters of the monetary
rule. Under indeterminacy, on the other hand, an increase in either φπ or φY causes,
somehow counterintuitively, an increase in the average gain. Second, the coherence,
too, is markedly higher under indeterminacy–further, the impact of an increase in
φY on the coherence is positive under indeterminacy, negative under determinacy.
Finally, the phase angle is decreasing in φπ within both regions, while it is increasing
in φY under determinacy, and decreasing under indeterminacy. An interesting ﬁnding
is that, while the output gap leads inﬂation for nearly all the parameters’ conﬁgura-
tions considered herein, for a small region of the parameters’ space characterised by
extremely low values of both φπ or φY t h eo p p o s i t eh o l d st r u e ,w i t hi n ﬂation leading
the output gap.35
Finally, ﬁgure 5 shows the logarithms of the standard deviations of the business-
cycle components of several macroeconomic time series. Consistent with the empirical
investigation in section 3.3., business-cycle components have been extracted by means
of the Christiano-Fitzgerald (2003) band-pass ﬁlter. [Here ﬁnish to comment. Key
35In his investigation of changes in U.K. macroeconomic performance over the post-WWII era, Be-
nati (2004) estimates a positive phase angle between the unemployment rate and inﬂation (namely,
a lead of inﬂation over the output gap) during the period of the high inﬂation of the 1970s. Admit-
tedly, such a result is based on a relatively short sample period. Still, however, it is an intriguing
one.
22points are:
(a) Nominal rate (i) the volatility of the business-cycle component of the nominal
rate is monotonically increasing in both phipi and phiy within both regions; (ii) there
are parameters’s conﬁgurations for which the volatility is greater under determinacy
than under indeterminacy (stress the intuition here).
(b) The volatilities of output, consumption, investment, and employment exhibit
a very similar pattern: (i) a marked diﬀerence between the two regions, with inde-
terminacy being characterised by a markedly larger volatility (so a move from inde-
terminacy before Volcker to determinacy after 1979 can indeed explain, in principle,
what we see in the data); (ii) all four volatilities are clearly decreasing in phiy under
indeterminacy, though not for phiy tending to 1; under determinacy they seem to be
slightly decreasing in phiy; (iii) the impact of phipi is not clear under indeterminacy,
while under determinacy it is clearly positive.
(c) Money growth: (i) again, huge diﬀerence between determinacy and indeter-
minacy, with latter regions characterised by a markedly greater volatility; (ii) under
determinacy, a negative impact of phipi and a positive one of phiy; (iii) a move from
indeterminacy (before Volcker) to determinacy (after 1979) cannot possibly explain
the increase in the volatility of the business-cycle componeent of money growth we
see in the data.
(d) Inﬂation and the price level show an analogous pattern (stress that this is
not necessarily to be expected, given that the stylised facts concerning the two are
not the same: for example, inﬂation is typically pro-cyclical while the price level is
counter-cyclical): (i) their volatilities are increasing in both phipi and phiy within
the indeterminacy regions; (ii) under determinacy they are (as expected) increasing
in phiy and decresing in phipi, but the eﬀect is almost negligible; (iii) the diﬀerence
between the two regions in terms of volatilities is quite huge.]
5 Can Shifts in Monetary Policy Explain Changes
in the Macroeconomic Stylised Facts?
Given that the indeterminacy region, compared with the determinacy region, is char-
acterised by a markedly diﬀerent set of ‘macroeconomic stylised facts’–inﬂation is
more persistent; the volatility of reduced-form innovations to both inﬂation and out-
put growth is greater; and the business-cycle components of key macro series are more
volatile–a possible explanation for the changes in key stylised facts we documented
in section 3 is that, as ﬁrst suggested by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), during
the highly volatile period preceding the appointment of Paul Volcker the economy
was operating under indeterminacy, and that the more aggressive monetary policy of
the post-1979 era moved it well inside the determinacy region. On the other hand,
given the overall modest responsiveness of macroeconomic stylised facts to changes
in the parameters of the monetary rule under determinacy, the alternative hypoth-
23esis that (a) the economy has been operating within the determinacy region during
both sub-periods, and (b) after 1979 monetary policy just got more activist, appears,
by itself –namely, without being accompanied by other changes in the economic
environment–incapable of explaining the marked changes we documented in section
3. Further, it is diﬃcult to make sense of the highly persistent behavior of inﬂa-
tion before Volcker’s appointment based on the results contained in ﬁgure (3a): with
inﬂation persistence under determinacy being always smaller than 0.5, estimates of
the sum of the AR coeﬃcients close to 1 are diﬃcult to rationalise.36 On the other
hand, as we will stress in what follows, the increase, post-1979, in the volatility of
the business-cycle component of money growth documented in section 3.3 appears
as impossible to rationalise in terms of a move from indeterminacy to determinacy.
In this section we therefore try to assess the plausibility of the hypothesis that the
diﬀerences between the two periods, in terms of macroeconomic stylised facts, may
originate from the fact that, before and after Volcker’s appointment, the economy has
been operating within the indeterminacy and, respectively, determinacy regions. We
therefore start by estimating forward-looking monetary rules for the three sub-periods
of interest.
5.1 Estimating forward-looking monetary rules
Table 6 reports results from estimating the following standard forward-looking mon-
etary rule:
rt = ρ1rt−1 + ρ2rt−2 +( 1− ρ1 − ρ2)˜ rt +  R,t (38)
˜ rt =˜ r + φπ
¡
πt+h|t − ˜ π
¢
+ φyyt+k|t (39)
where rt is the Federal funds rate; ˜ rt is the target rate at time t; ρ1 and ρ2 are partial
adjustment coeﬃcients; ˜ π is the inﬂation target; ˜ r=ϕ+˜ π is the long-run target for
the Federal funds rate, with ϕ being the long-run equilibrium real rate;  R,t is a zero-
mean, serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock; and πt+h|t and yt+k|t are expected
inﬂation and the expected output gap at time t+h and, respectively, t+k,b a s e do n
information at time t. Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) we set ϕ equal
to the full-sample mean of the ex-post r e a lF e d e r a lf u n d sr a t e ,w h i c ha l l o w su st o
separately identify ˜ π.
Estimation is performed via two-stage least squares based on quarterly CPI inﬂa-
tion, quoted at an annual rate,37 and using three alternative proxies for the output
36Adding a vector of autocorrelated structural disturbances to the model as in, e.g., ? does not
solve the problem unless (a) the disturbances were very strongly correlated before Volcker, and (b)
they have become much less correlated after 1979. This can be easily illustrated by means of the
simple process yt=ρyt−1+ut, where the disturbance ut evolves according to ut=φut−1+ t.A s s u m i n g
ρ=0.5, for the sum of the AR coeﬃcients of the reduced-form expression for yt to be equal to 0.95,
φ should be equal to 0.9. Further, a near-unit root for yt can only be obtained based on a near-unit
root ut.
37Qualitatively similar results based on the 3-month CPI inﬂation (quoted at an annual rate)
24gap: the CBO output gap measure, constructed as described in section 2, and either
one-sided or two-sided HP-ﬁltered log real GDP. The rationale for considering also
the one-sided estimate is that, compared with the two-sided estimate, the CBO out-
put gap measure, or (linearly or quadratically) detrended log real GDP, it presents
the advantage of not being based on future information, and therefore of partially
addressing Orphanides’ criticism.38 The set of instruments includes a constant and
four lags of the Federal Funds rate, the inﬂation rate, the output gap measure, the
quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the producer price index for fuels and related
products (quoted at an annual rate); and the spread between the rate on 10-year
constant-maturity Treasury bills and the rate on the 3-month Treasury bill quoted in
the secondary market. Since, as shown in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), results
for alternative forecasting horizons are broadly similar, in what follows we uniquely
focus on the one-quarter ahead horizon. Very similar results based on IV estimation
(in which we instrument πt+1 with πt−1) for either quarterly CPI or quarterly GDP
deﬂator inﬂation, based on either of the three output gap proxies, are available upon
request.
We also estimated (38)-(39) via GMM, based on the same set of instruments, and
using a Newey and West (1987) estimate of the covariance matrix to compute the
weighting matrix for the GMM criterion. (Numerical minimisation of the criterion was
performed via the Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm, as implemented by the MATLAB
subroutine fminsearch.m.) Quite surprisingly, in the light of the results reported
in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), we were not able to obtain a consistent set of
meaningful results. First, in some cases the algorithm converged to ‘non-sensical’
solutions. Second, in the other cases results were not consistent across inﬂation and
output gap measures. Given the idiosyncracies which are unfortunately typical of
numerical optimisation methods, we have therefore reluctantly decided to resort to
2SLS, less high-tech but, we believe, more robust.
sampled at the monthly frequency, and based on two alternative output gap proxies–either the
one-sided, or the two-sided activity factor used in section 3.4–are available upon request.
38See in particular Orphanides (2001). We say partially as we are dealing with revised data,
instead of real-time data.
25Table 6 Estimated forward-looking Taylor rules based
on quarterly CPI inﬂation, quoted at an annual rate
˜ π(a) φπ φy ρ1 ρ2 ρ
Based on one-sided HP-ﬁltered log real GDP
Before Volcker -6.2E-4 0.72 0.09 1.02 -0.32 0.70
(0.02) (0.09) (0.25) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08)
Volcker-Greenspan 0.03 2.50 1.12 0.78 0.12 0.90
(0.04) (1.01) (1.21) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
Post-1982 0.03 1.17 2.13 1.33 -0.40 0.93
(0.37) (0.84) (1.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.03)
Based on two-sided HP-ﬁltered log real GDP
Before Volcker -0.03 0.74 0.86 0.95 -0.17 0.78
(0.06) (0.11) (0.54) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07)
Volcker-Greenspan 0.05 2.42 3.27 0.77 0.16 0.93
(0.07) (1.24) (3.21) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
Post-1982 -0.02 0.68 2.48 1.17 -0.30 0.87
(0.04) (0.47) (0.66) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03)
Based on the CBO output gap measure
Before Volcker -9.6E-3 0.74 0.37 0.95 -0.23 0.72
(0.02) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Volcker-Greenspan 0.03 2.96 0.89 0.78 0.14 0.91
(0.03) (1.50) (1.26) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
Post-1982 0.02 1.74 1.10 1.33 -0.40 0.92
(0.06) (0.80) (0.72) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03)
(a) In percentage points.
Results based on either output gap proxy are broadly in line with those reported in
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), with the period
preceding Volcker’s appointment being characterised, ﬁrst, by a signiﬁcantly lower
inertia in interest rate setting; and second, by a markedly less aggressive monetary
policy than during the post-1979 era. Analogous results based on (a) quarterly GDP
deﬂator inﬂation (quoted at an annual rate), and the same three output gap proxies;
and (b) a backward-looking version of (38)-(39) estimated based on either CPI or
GDP deﬂator inﬂation, and the same three output gap proxies, are available upon
request. Overall, empirical evidence seems therefore to lend strong support to the
conventional wisdom notion of a drastic change in the conduct of monetary policy fol-
lowing Volcker’s appointment. For our purposes, however, the key issue is not whether
U.S. monetary policy has become more aggressive after 1979, but rather whether it
w a ss u c ht og i v er i s et oa nindeterminate equilibrium before Volcker’s appointment.
As we previously stressed, indeed, given (a) the weak reasponsiveness of key macro-
economic stylised facts to changes in the extent of activism of monetary policy which
appears to be typical of the determinacy region; and (b) the fact that some stylised
26facts typical of the pre-Volcker era–like high inﬂation persistence–cannot possibly
arise (at least, conditional on the calibration adopted herein) under determinacy, the
only way to generate diﬀerences in the macroeconomic stylised facts between the two
sub-periods comparable to those we observed in the data is to have the U.S. economy
operating within the indeterminacy region before Volcker’s appointment.
5.2 Stylised facts generated by estimated monetary rules
Table 7 reports a series of stylised facts generated by the Smets-Wouters model condi-
tional on the estimates of forward-looking rules reported in table 6. Estimates based
on two output gap proxies out of three–one-sided HP-ﬁltered log real GDP, and the
CBO output gap measure–imply that during the pre-Volcker era the U.S. economy
was operating under indeterminacy. Results based on the third output gap proxy, as
well as results based on GDP deﬂator inﬂation and either of the three output gap
proxies, suggest instead that, in spite of a marked increase in the extent of activism
post-1979, the U.S. economy was operating under determinacy in the pre-Volcker era,
too. As the table clearly shows, the two sets of estimates generate markedly diﬀer-
ent sets of stylised facts. Focusing on the estimates based on two-sided HP-ﬁltered
log GDP and on the CBO output gap measure–which are broadly representative of
the two sets–the former ones imply virtually no change in the stylised facts before
and after Volcker’s appointment, with the only exception of the phase angle between
the output gap and inﬂation. Crucially, inﬂation persistence and the volatility of
reduced-form innovations to inﬂation and output growth exhibit either no variation,
or a negligible amount of variation, between the two periods. This is in spite of the
q u i t em a r k e di n c r e a s ei nt h ee x t e n to fa c t i v i s mp o s t - 1 9 7 9d o c u m e n t e di nt a b l e6 ,
and reﬂects the previously stressed overall lack of responsiveness of most macroeco-
nomic facts to the conduct of monetary policy within the determinacy region. Finally,
inﬂation persistence is never greater than 0.48 for either of the three sub-periods.
Estimates based on the CBO output gap measure, on the other hand, imply
marked changes in the model-generated stylised facts corresponding to the pre- and
post-1979 eras, broadly capable of replicating the main features we have seen in the
data for most series. Inﬂation persistence, for example, falls from 0.99 to less than
0.5, while the volatility of reduced-form innovations to inﬂation and output growth
falls by 83% and respectively 67%. In the data, the fall in volatility for the two post-
1979 sub-periods is equal to 11% (Volcker-Greenspan) and 35% (post-1982) based on
quarterly CPI; to 73% and 71% based on the GDP deﬂator; and to 36% and 47%
b a s e do nm o n t h l yC P I .
Turning to the correlation between the output gap and inﬂation, estimated mon-
etary rules imply an increase in the lead of the output gap over inﬂation, while the
data do not point towards any clear-cut indication. On the other hand, exactly as
we have seen in the data both the gain and the coherence experience a decrease,
post-1979, compared with the pre-Volcker era.
27Table 7 Stylised facts generated by the Smets-Wouters model condi-
tional on estimated monetary rules
Output gap measure:
HP-ﬁltered log real GDP CBO gap
one-sided two-sided measure
BV VG PO BV VG PO BV VG PO
Inﬂation:
persistence 0.94 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.99 0.45 0.47
volatility of shocks 0.31 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.07
Output growth:
volatility of shocks 0.78 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.53 0.18 0.17
S t .d e v .o fﬁltered:
output 1.37 0.48 0.44 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.73 0.55 0.55
consumption 1.30 0.48 0.45 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.73 0.56 0.55
investment 3.29 0.55 0.55 0.42 0.49 0.44 1.37 0.70 0.70
employment 1.14 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.71 0.57 0.58
inﬂation 0.56 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.72 0.21 0.21
prices 1.80 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.51 2.40 0.51 0.50
nominal rate 0.49 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.68 0.21 0.21
money growth 0.61 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.69 0.23 0.24
Output-inﬂation:
phase angle 0.27 -0.88 -0.27 -0.51 -1.16 -0.60 -0.03 -1.21 -0.56
coherence 0.40 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.36 0.09 0.076
gain 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.36 0.03 0.03
BV=before Volcker; VG=Volcker-Greenspan; PO=post-1982
Finally, turning to the volatility of the business-cycle components of macroeco-
nomic indicators, for all of them estimated monetary rules for the three sub-periods
imply a fall in volatility post-1979 compared with the pre-Volcker era. This is in line
with what we have seen in the data with the only exception of money growth, whose
component’s volatility has actually increased
[To be ﬁnished. Stress the following:
• The increase in the volatility of the business-cycle component of money growth
clearly runs against a determinacy/indeterminacy based explanation of diﬀer-
ences between the sets of stylised facts for the two periods.
• On the other hand, it appears as very diﬃcult to explain high inﬂation persis-
tence within this setup without appealing to indeterminacy. Stress once again
why the story of the autocorrelated shocks is not convincing.
• If we do not believe in the estimates that imply that before Volcker the U.S.
economy was operating under indeterminacy, and we believe on the contrary
28that it has been operating under determinacy all along, then, what can explain
the pattern we’ve seen in the data? Some candidates that have been advanced
in the literature–like better inventory management, by McConnell and Peres-
Quiros–may explain one of these changes, an increase in output stability. But
they can’t possibly explain the broad set of stylised facts we’ve documented.
How can you explain, based on such a notion, the fall in inﬂation persistence,
in the volatility of its reduced-form innovations, etc.?
• Conclude with an agnostic tone, but stress that if before Volcker the U.S. econ-
omy was not operating under indeterminacy, then we must be able to ﬁnd some
diﬀerence between the two periods that has a broad-based impact on many dif-
ferent variables at the same time, and that may account for the overall set of
changes we have documented.]
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Several papers–see, e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004)–have documented how the reaction function of the U.S. monetary authority
has been passive, and destabilising, before the appointment of Paul Volcker, and
active and stabilising since then. In this paper we ﬁrst compare and contrast the two
sub-periods in terms of several key business-cycle ‘stylised facts’. The latter period
appears to be characterised by a lower inﬂation persistence; a smaller volatility of
reduced-form innovations to both inﬂation and real GDP growth; and a systematically
smaller amplitude of business-cycle frequency ﬂuctuations.
Working with the Smets-Wouters (2003) sticky-price, sticky-wage DSGE model
of the U.S. economy, we then investigate how such stylised facts change systemati-
cally with changes in the parameters of a simple forward-looking monetary rule. We
solve the model under indeterminacy via the procedure introduced by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003). The two regions appear to be characterised by a markedly diﬀer-
ent set of macroeconomic stylised facts. Further, in several cases the relationship be-
tween the parameters of the monetary rule and key stylised facts under indeterminacy
is a sort of mirror image of what it is under determinacy: both inﬂation persistence
and the volatility of its reduced-form innovations, for example, are increasing in the
coeﬃcient on inﬂation under indeterminacy, decreasing under determinacy.
Finally, we compare the stylised facts identiﬁed in the data with those generated
by the Smets-Wouters model conditional on estimated monetary rules. Although
variation in the monetary rule across sub-periods can, in principle, explain a signiﬁ-
cant fraction of the variation in the stylised facts we consider, results are in general
not consistent across diﬀerent inﬂation measures and output gap proxies. In partic-
ular, some of our estimates imply that the pre-Volcker era, too, was characterised by
a determinate equilibrium, in spite of the lower activism of the monetary rule.
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33A The Monthly Indicators Used in the Construc-
tion of the Activity Factor
Here follows a list of the monthly indicators used in the construction of the activity
factor we used in section 3.4. For reasons of space, we only report acronyms and data
sources.
Interest rates: G S 1 0 ,G S 1 ,G S 3 ,G S 5 ,T B 3 M S ,M P R I M E ,A A A ,B A A( s o u r c e :
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
Employment and unemployment indicators: UNRATE, USCONS, USFIRE, US-
GOOD, USSERV, USPBS, USTRADE, SRVPRD, USTPU, USWTRADE, MANEMP,
UEMP15OV, UEMPLT5, UNEMPLOY, PAYEMS, EMRATIO, CE16OV (source:
U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Banking indicators: B U S L O A N S ,C O N S U M E R ,O T H S E C ,R E A L L N ,T O T A L S L ,
INVEST, LOANINV, LOANS, NONREVSL, USGSEC (source: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System).
Cyclical indicators: INDPRO (source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System), NAPM (source: Institute for Supply Management), HELPWANT (source:
Conference Board),
Producer prices: PPIFCG, PPIFCF, PPIENG, PPICRM, PPICPE, PPIACO,
PFCGEF, PPIITM, PPIIDC, PPIFGS (source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau
of Labor Statistics).
B The Berkowitz and Diebold (1998) Multivariate
Spectral Bootstrap Procedure
The Berkowitz-Diebold spectral bootstrap–a multivariate generalisation of the Franke
and Hardle (1992) univariate bootstrap–can be brieﬂy described as follows. Let
Zt=[xt, πt]0,a n dl e tΦZ(ωj), IZ(ωj),a n dFZ(ωj) be the population spectral density
matrix; the unsmoothed sample spectral density matrix; and the smoothed sample
spectral density matrix (i.e., the consistent estimator of ΦZ(ωj)), for the random vec-
tor Zt, all corresponding to the Fourier frequency ωj.A si ti sw e l lk n o w n 39, IZ(ωj)
converges in distribution to a N-dimensional–in the present case, a 2-dimensional–
complex Wishart distribution with one degree of freedom and scale matrix equal to
FZ(ωj),n a m e l y
IZ(ωj)
d → W2,C (1,F Z (ωj)) (40)
where Ws,C (h,H) is a s-dimensional complex Wishart distribution with h degrees of







2,C (1,I 2)FZ (ωj)
1
2 (41)
39See for example Brillinger (1981).
34for all the Fourier frequencies ωj=2πj/T, j=1,2, ..., [T/2], with T being the sample
length, and [·] meaning ‘the largest integer of’. Conﬁd e n c ei n t e r v a l sa r ec o m p u t e db y
ﬁrst getting a smoothed estimate of the spectral density matrix, FZ (ωj). Then, for
each ωj=2πj/T, j=1,2, ..., [T/2], we generate 1000 random draws from (41), thus get-
ting bootstrapped, artiﬁcial (unsmoothed) spectral density matrices, we smooth them
exactly as we previously did with IZ(ωj), and we compute the average cross-spectral
statistics at the business-cycle frequencies based on (2)-(4). For each sub-sample, the
95% conﬁdence interval is then given by the 95% upper and lower percentiles of the
bootstrapped distribution.
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